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Introduction 
For many centuries the "Great Silk Road" had 
been one of the largest, the most famous and 
successful projects of the Middle Ages. Great 
caravans transferred rare goods from Eastern 
Asia to the Mediterranean by this proven and 
challenging route. 
Nowadays, the idea of creating a fast and safe 
route to transfer millions of containers to the 
West becomes relevant especially with evolving 
technologies and China transforming into a 
world factory. The Chinese did not even have to 
invent a name and a route, but only had to 
adapt the experience of the ancestors to the 
modern world. However, the Americans, who 
announced the beginning of their work back in 
2011, had already taken the name “New Silk 
Road”. Therefore, the authorities of China had 
to come up with a new name for their future 
project – “One Belt One Road” (OBOR). Despite 
the difference of the names, the action takes 
place in the same area and has one stated goal 
— to transport goods from Asia to Europe.  
Nevertheless, the USA and China have not 
joined their forces to develop the infrastructure 
for the projects, as they have ultimately 
different views on the future of the "caravan 
track". While Beijing was pursuing mostly 
economic goals, Washington considered the 
development of Central Asia as also a tool of 
containing Russia and reducing the dependence 
on former USSR-republics from Moscow. It was 
supposed that Central Asia republics, linked by 
numerous "New Silk Road" infrastructural 
projects, would transit their hydrocarbons to 
the West in avoidance of Russian pipelines and 
transport routes. Another purpose of 
Washington was to support the development 
of the region that should provide republics with 
alternatives against Chinese economic (and 
political) expansion and let the U.S. withdraw 
American forces from Afghanistan without 
leaving chaos behind. Although both the 
countries had reasons, however, the experts in 
China and the U.S. came up with the same idea 
of the development of Central Asia republics 
through the implementation of high-profile 
projects. 
An analysis of the U.S.-China competition in 
Central Asia has a significant value for the 
region since it indicates who are the global 
leaders interested in the regional development 
of Central Asian republics and on what amount 
of global investments Central Asian republics 
can count. In this article, we study and compare 
both projects, considering geopolitical 
concepts, resources and efforts put by the U.S. 
and China on Central Asia development and 
what results they have achieved at the present 
moment. Thus, this analysis clarifies why the US 
have lost their influence in the region, while 
China strengthens its position changing Central 
Asian political and economic landscape through 
the implementation of a set of OBOR’s projects. 
This statement can be proved over scrutinising 
years of U.S’s inactivity on the TAPI pipeline 
(Turkmenistan - Afghanistan - Pakistan - India) 
and very modest benefits from the CASA-1000 
project. Another proof of this assessment is the 
decision of the U.S. President Trump to 
withdraw the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership – the union that has been 
considered as overweight to the Chinese 
economic expansion in Asia. The research 
begins with an analysis of the literature on U.S.-
Chinese Silk Road competition. Based on the 
scholarly review, we can conclude that the US-
led project "New Silk Road" has lost to its 
Chinese peer’s devotion to the OBOR’s 
successes. This is followed by critical and 
comparative analysis of advantages and 
disadvantages of each project separately. The 
concluding remarks are outlined in the final 
section.  In the next section, we describe the 
methods.  
Methods and Sources 
This research uses historical and comparative 
methods. Under the historical approach, both 
projects arrange in chronological order from 
their birth to January 2017, while their 
distinctions are analysed using a comparative 
approach. Additionally, important data was 
collated from regular and systematic 
observation of academic journals, news 
articles, and content analysis of government 
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resources of China, Kazakhstan, the U.S. and 
Russia. 
Over the last five years, both projects went 
through careful analysis and broad discussions 
within an expert community across the world. 
Authors from the U.S., China, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and India have laid out their views on 
the “New Silk Road” and “OBOR” (please refer 
to Figure 1 for proposed China’s New Silk 
Roads), often speaking in favour of one of 
them.  To provide a strong background for this 
article, we also used official sources of political 
points of view and papers by experts from the 
U.S., China, Central Asia and Russia.  
For example, an expert from Kazakhstan, Murat 
Laumulin, analysed the approaches of foreign 
experts on Central Asia and concluded that 
China and the U.S. have significantly 
heightened involvement into the region over 
the last years and pursue the same goals – that 
is, to sustain stability and development in 
Central Asia. Other vital sources originate from 
Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies. For 
example, experts Bulat Auelbaev, Sanat 
Kushkumbaev, Konstantin Syroezhkin and 
Vyacheslav Dodonov analysed e OBOR in a 
report entitled "Central Asia - 2020: four 
strategic concepts" (Auelbaev et al., 2015). 
They suppose that Beijing can unite Central 
Asia under OBOR, but that Chinese dominance 
may lead to several negative consequences to 
local countries such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. One 
such consequence is the local countries’ strong 
financial dependence on Chinese investments 
and industrial capacities or uncontrolled labour 
migration from China. An additional important 
source, Kazakh expert Konstantin Syroezhkin, in 
the article “Transport Corridors in Eurasia: 
Economy or Geopolitics”, stresses that the 
Chinese project has “an undisputable 
advantage” as Beijing is ready to invest a good 
deal of money in a very short period 
(Syroezhkin, 2015). 
In Russia, director of the Analytical Centre of 
Institute of International Studies (MGIMO 
University, Russia), Andrei Kazantsev, in his 
article "Transport Corridors through Central 
Asia: How to Create Integrated Network amidst 
Geopolitical Tensions?" concludes that despite 
good-looking plans to Central Asian 
development, countries of the region should 
overcome existing geopolitical contradictions 
and form a common ground for cooperation. 
Otherwise, the implementation of any, even 
the most successful, infrastructural project will 
take decades (Kazantsev, 2015).  
From the American side, this research focuses 
on a paper of particular interest titled "2016 
Global Forecast" by Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies” (CSIS) experts Craig 
Cohen and Melissa Dalton. They emphasise 
that the U.S. government is ill-equipped to 
have a leading role in regional mega-
development, while China can push OBOR 
forward for a short time, but overinvestment in 
mega-projects might make the Chinese 
economy vulnerable (Cohen and Dalton, 2015). 
Bruno Maçães, Ivan Zuenko and other 
contributors to the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace hold almost the same 
views. In their articles, they focus on the 
geopolitical dimension of OBOR, stressing that 
the project may be economically unsound for 
China (Maçães, 2016; Zuenko, 2016). It is also 
worth to notice that American experts in both 
CSIS and Carnegie do not mention the 
American “New Silk Way” project.  
Besides, a significant contribution to this article 
is the book "China's One Belt One Road 
Initiative" written by Chinese scholars Tai Wei 
Lim, Katherine Hui Tseng and Wen Xin Lim. 
Looking at the economic and political 
dimensions of OBOR, they agree that the 
project has a great chance to change the 
geopolitical landscape in Central Asia in favour 
of China, given China's vast financial, human 
and political resources (Lim et al., 2016). Of the 
numerous news sources, the most useful for 
this paper were official governmental resources 
that reflect official points of view. In Russia, the 
Kremlin’s attitude towards "New Silk Road" and 
OBOR is conveyed in "Rossiyskaya Gazeta". The 
government of Kazakhstan publishes its 
statements in "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" 
newspaper, and the People's Republic of China 
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has its official news source called "Xinhua News 
Agency".  
For this research, we collected sources from 
each of the national papers and press releases 
and statements from the archive of the U.S. 
State Department. In the frameworks of careful 
analysis of sources as mentioned above, we 
summed up various points of view regarding 
the advantages and disadvantages of each 
project and their transformation over the 
years.  
 
Figure 1:  The Map of “One Belt One Road Initiative” 
Source: Council on Foreign Relations. 
Results 
Mega-infrastructural projects such as OBOR 
and "New Silk Road" are usually considered as 
an array of smaller projects united by a 
common purpose. Both the projects aim at the 
development of Central Asian transport routes 
for delivering goods or hydrocarbons to the 
West, but their implementation started in 
slightly different areas and under comparable 
circumstances. For the U.S., their most 
preferable goal was to establish order on the 
South of the region to transportate resources 
over Turkmenistan-India routes, thereby 
avoiding Russia, but China started investing om 
infrastructure with the key aim to deliver goods 
to Europe. However, both these projects 
offered a unique opportunity for Central Asian 
countries – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan - to attract 
investments in building railroads, motorways, 
pipelines, etc. Indeed, the interaction of 
countries through OBOR and "New Silk Road" 
should give a boost for a new round of 
economic development in Central Asia. Also, it 
is important to stress that growth of the 
regional economy can become a common 
ground for the most effective resolution of the 
whole host of local, ecological, political, 
security and other issues. 
Although these issues are well researched by 
experts from Kazakhstan (Laumulin, 2011), 
Russia (Kazantsev, 2015), China (Lim et al, 
2016) and United States (Cohen and Dalton, 
2015), however, there are lack of 
comprehensive studies devoted to probe the 
reasons of OBOR’s successes and failure of the 
“New Silk Road”. The following section 
discusses these issues.  
Discussion 
The Implementation of Chinese "One Belt One 
Road" 
The Chinese alternative to the “Silk Road”, as 
mentioned elsewhere, comprises of several 
components under the title “One Belt One 
Road”. Despite the direct analogy with its 
medieval precedent, the proposed trading 
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megaproject has fundamental differences.  This 
is primarily due to qualitative changes to 
technology. Besides, the significant amount of 
goods to be traded via the proposed route is 
reckoned to have a massive geopolitical impact 
on this proposed supply route (Cheng, 2016). 
Within the framework of the OBOR project that 
covers the regions with almost 30% of the 
world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Beijing 
intends to implement a range of transport, 
infrastructure and telecommunication projects 
from China to Europe through Central Asia, 
South Asia and the Middle East (Huang, 2016, 
pp.314-321). Particular attention is being paid 
to the transport component because China not 
only aims to transfer goods and passengers 
from Asia to Europe but also aims to sell the 
transport itself — locomotives, trucks and 
planes. Moreover, the development of 
transport infrastructure directly serves the 
second goal of the Chinese alternative to the 
“Silk Road”, specifically the trade development 
in the participating countries and support in 
developing their economy to a level capable of 
guaranteeing the sufficient purchasing power 
and demand for Chinese products (Eom, 2016, 
pp.1-2). Chinese authorities immediately 
repudiated connections with "Marshal Plan" to 
their project, saying that the implementation of 
infrastructural projects does not suggest the 
control over neighbouring countries (Lim et al. 
2016). 
The OBOR is supposed to implement projects in 
four directions: to improve regional 
infrastructure; to increase the level of 
cooperation of regional economics; to lower 
trade barriers and to promote the development 
of cultural relations for future projects. Xi 
Jinping, the president of China, stated that 
owing to new projects, the annual trade 
volume will surpass $2.5 trillion over the next 
decade – the sum equal to the estimated 
investments into the project. According to the 
Ministry of Commerce of China, for the first six 
months of 2015, Chinese companies have 
signed 1,401 agreements on the 
implementations of the infrastructural project 
in Central Asia. These contracts are worth 
about $37.6 billion and make out 43.4% of the 
total number of contracts signed during the 
specified period (Zimmerman, 2015). By April 
2016, the share of “One Belt One Road” newly-
signed contracts has risen to 52.5%, amounting 
$31.12 billion (Ministry of Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2016). 
The Chinese believe that the economic 
development will help the countries of Central 
and South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan in 
particular) to get free from such notions as 
“terrorism” and secure transport routes. The 
idea is that most Afghans work on opium fields 
or join extremist and terrorist groups (Taliban 
or ISIS-Khorasan) as militants, because of lack 
of workplaces on territories controlled by the 
official government. New infrastructural 
projects are aimed at creating new jobs that, 
supposedly, would prevent people from joining 
a terrorist organisation.  
The issue of transport safety is one of the 
central problems on the way to implement the 
infrastructural projects. For instance, the China 
Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through 
three hazardous explosion provinces: the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China 
and the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 
Balochistan (where the highly important port of 
Gwadar is located) in Pakistan. Besides the 
human factor, this route in recent years has 
repeatedly been exposed to the forces of 
nature. In particular, on 4 January 2010, a 
massive landslide near the town of Karimabad 
flooded the 20 km area of the “Karakum” road, 
including a 310-metre  bridge, which was 
restored only in 2015. 
Even though trade routes are passing precisely 
over the borders of a hazardous Afghanistan, 
the neighbouring country remains quite 
dangerous for OBOR. Afghanistan shares the 
borders with the Xinjiang Uyghur region, 
through which the future trade routes will 
certainly pass (the province have borders with 
seven countries – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Mongolia, Kashmir and 
Afghanistan). Beijing fears that separatists from 
the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, many of 
whom have found refuge under the wing of Al-
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Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Islamic State, will 
return to their homeland. Chinese authorities 
call Afghanistan the "Eurasian Land Bridge" due 
to its "exceptional geographical advantages" 
and intend to make it a "major transport, trade, 
logistic, the cultural, scientific and educational 
center" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic 
of China, 2016). 
Given such objectives, Chinese Ambassador to 
Pakistan, Sun Weidong stressed that China 
anticipates enhancing cooperation with Iran on 
the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) project. This Chinese-Iranian 
cooperation aims to weaken U.S. influence in 
the Middle East, cooperation that looks like a 
practical implementation of the principle— 
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. Iran, a 
potential regional leader, is also interested in 
establishing a new trade corridor through 
Pakistan to provide supplements for its growing 
free-from-sanctions economy and in 
strengthening relations with Islamabad, a close 
friend of Iran’s regional rival – Saudi Arabia. 
China already has several trade routes with Iran 
through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and 
Azerbaijan, but the idea of CPEC is to build 
additional routes (both railroads and highways) 
for Chinese energy imports from the Middle 
East that will help to decrease Chinese 
dependence on sea routes (Wilson, 2016). 
In the framework of its infrastructural projects’ 
implementation, Beijing intends to design on its 
own and request assistance from international 
organisations. The only condition is that 
Western forces will not influence the projects, 
for Asians should handle "Asian problems", as 
firmly believed in Chinese academic circles. 
China began the search for financial resources 
within internal sources. In April 2015, it became 
known that China Development Bank and the 
Export-Import Bank of China would invest $62 
billion to support OBOR projects ($32 and $30 
billion respectively). The China International 
Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) would 
spend another $113 billion in debt financing to 
support more than 300 projects under OBOR. 
The People's Bank of China has planned to 
invest $20 billion in 2015 and another $100 
billion over the next three years. Additionally, 
in December 2014 Beijing founded the "Silk 
Road Fund" with a capital of $40 billion, $16 
billion of which will be used to finance 
infrastructure projects in Central Asia. In mid-
April, the People's Bank of China announced 
the first investment of $1.65 billion in the 
construction of a hydroelectric power station 
on the Jhelum River in northern Pakistan 
(Freeman-Jr., 2015). 
Another sufficient financial instrument for 
China's plans is the recently established Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It is 
planned that AIIB will pose as an international 
institution for 57 countries with a capital of 
$100 billion. In the West, the AIIB is considered 
an analogue to the Bretton Woods institutions 
(IMF, IBRD and the World Bank), which mostly 
represent the developed, rather than 
developing countries. However, it is difficult to 
talk about the independent nature of AIIB, 
taking into account that 30% of the assets 
belong to its chief founder – China (Kuo and 
Tang, 2015). 
It is believed that the New Development Bank 
(NDB), founded by the members of BRICS in 
July 2014 with a start-up capital of $50 billion, 
will support the OBOR. Beijing is flattered by 
the fact that the first project of NDB will be the 
investment in the Chinese Yuan, however, as 
experts insist, due to the equal shares of the 
BRICS members in the NDB, it will be quite 
challenging to persuade all the five countries to 
invest in OBOR projects. Instead, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is ready to 
provide definitive support, in spite of the fears 
on the Russian side over the expansion of 
China’s influence in Central Asia. For example, 
Kazakhstan, one of the most active members of 
SCO, is ready to invest at least $9 billion into 
infrastructure development (Blood et al., 2016). 
Primarily, in March 2015, the Secretary-General 
of the SCO, Dmitry Mezentsev, announced that 
the organisation should combine development 
strategy with China’s “Silk Road” strategy and 
that all of the members are invited to 
participate in this project (Dudina, 2015). Four 
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months later, President Xi Jinping and President 
Vladimir Putin agreed upon to take steps to 
integrate OBOR within the framework of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), using the SCO 
as a platform (Orient Advisory Group, 2015). 
Based on extensive support, China has 
developed at least 17 projects that will be 
under construction in 2017. Among them are 
the extension of Baku International Port Alyat, 
the building Kuala Lumpur – Singapore, Baku – 
Tbilisi – Kars, China-Laos, Dali-Ruili railroads, 
creation of Amur bridge, Samarga port, Busan 
New Port Expressway II, M-11 Moscow - St. 
Petersburg and Karachi-Hyderabad motorways, 
Turkmenbashi International Sea Port, Ukraine 
Bypass Rail (Zhuravka-Millerovo), East Coast 
Rail Line, Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge, 
Chabahar Port and Karakoram Highway (Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, 2016).  
Impressive Start and Failure of American “New 
Silk Road" 
In 2011, the Executive Office of the U.S. 
President Barack Obama announced the launch 
of its new project, the “New Silk Road”, to unite 
Central Asia with India, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan into a single transport corridor. 
The then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton 
stressed that the “New Silk Road” is a regional 
approach to peace in Afghanistan and Central 
Asia after the withdrawal of the U.S. and 
International Security Assistance Force; (ISAF) 
combat forces from the region (Clinton, 2011). 
The United States as well as OBOR stand for the 
implementation of major infrastructure 
projects and even identified up to 40 of them 
(Kucera, 2011). However, for the past four 
years since the launch of the project, the U.S. 
can continue to boast only two large-scale 
ventures. They are — TAPI pipeline 
(Turkmenistan - Afghanistan - Pakistan - India), 
the construction of which was announced at 
the end of 2015, and the power project to 
supply electricity from Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, under 
the title of CASA-1000 (Figure 2).  
 
         Figure 2: The Map of CASA-1000 
Source: CASA-1000 official website,http://www.casa-1000.org/ 
The TAPI project came to a standstill due to 
lack of proper funding and lack of construction 
conditions including the lack of security as one 
of the critical problems, but the CASA-1000 
project is still developing as was planned. 
Funding for the project, which should be 
completed by 2018, comes from the World 
Bank, the Islamic Bank and the USAID agency. 
The planners arranged for excessive electricity 
from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to be sold to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (300 and 1000 MW, 
respectively). The authorities of Kabul have 
estimated that the transit of electricity will 
bring only $45 billion annually. The American 
project piqued the interest of even China, a 
state usually wary of joint initiatives, and a 
nation that has not given an official consent for 
their participation. By contrast, Afghanistan, 
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Pakistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan—all signed 
the agreement in Istanbul in 2015.  
However, the Americans agreed upon to 
China’s participation in their project, but they 
also fear Chinese supremacy in the region and 
secretly discourage their allies to participate in 
AIIB. “It is important for the U.S.A. that the 
space between China and Turkey was open to 
American investments and free from foreign 
hegemony and radicalism”, said Ariel Cohen, 
the American analyst (Heritage Foundation 
Conference, 2015). 
Officially, Obama denied reports about strong 
U.S. opposition concerning the strengthening of 
China’s role in international financial 
institutions. However, Beijing does not 
gravitate toward close cooperation with the 
West over the “silk” projects. At the same time, 
members of AIIB expect offers of equal value 
from the West. The office does not suggest any 
new ideas, confine itself to local projects such 
as the reorganisation of Afghanistan Customs 
Department (a department that allows trains to 
reduce the time of customs clearance nearly 
three times), or study the construction 
possibilities of potential railway tracks on the 
territory of Afghanistan. Curiously, the 
construction of railways lies in the spectre of 
interests of both nations, but the U.S. and 
China have not yet found common points. 
Beijing promotes projects in this direction, 
financing them through the Asian Development 
Bank. In 2011, a 75-km long railway was built 
from Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairatan on the 
Uzbekistan border. In December 2014, China, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Iran and Afghanistan 
signed an agreement to build a railway linking 
the Kashgar Prefecture in the Xinjiang province 
with the Herat Province in Afghanistan, from 
where the goods transfer in the direction of 
Iran.  
Despite multiple contradictions with Beijing, 
Obama's administration regularly declared that 
China's project plays a decisive role in the 
development of Afghanistan and the region 
altogether. Nevertheless, in the "New Silk 
Road" conference hosted at the "Heritage 
Foundation" in December 2015, Amos 
Hochstein, the Coordinator for International 
Energy Affairs of the US Department of State, 
set U.S. goals to be the implementation of the 
"New Silk Road" and China's role in these goals:   
We have spoken on this topic in 
government circles, brain trusts, 
business circles, and they all focused 
their attention on Europe's energy 
security... It is one of the principles of 
the Silk Road — to supply energy to 
Europe...So, why do we not integrate all 
major projects, such as CASA-1000, 
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline and 
Southern Gas Corridor, into one united 
"New Silk Road"? Why do gas and 
electricity go only in one direction? We 
must ensure that goods and services are 
spreading in all directions, where we 
can reach...I think that the Chinese 
project correlates with our goals to 
some extent. But we are consumers and 
China is the seller; physically we are not 
neighbours with Central Asia, and China 
has direct contact with it (Heritage 
Foundation Conference, 2015).  
On account of this statement, Hochstein 
emphasised that China and the U.S. have 
different approaches, but the same goals— 
development of the regions, energy security of 
Europe and ability to diversify supply routes of 
hydrocarbons for suppliers and consumers. 
According to him, the U.S. should lend 
maximum financial assistance to the region of 
Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, to provide 
choice to exporters of goods and energy 
resources, in particular, where they should 
distribute these resources - not only in Europe 
but also in Asia. However, the representative of 
the Obama administration did not announce 
specific figures and plans for financing 
development projects, and will not likely 
announce figures or plans in Donald Trump's 
presidency.  
Given a long distance from Central Asia and 
numerous obstacles, the Obama administration 
focused on another project, known popularly as 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that is aimed at 
deepening economic integration in South Asia 
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with engagement to the Central Asian region. 
The partnership of 12 Pacific Rim countries 
accounts for over 40 per cent of the global 
GDP, and countries consider it overweight and 
insurance against Chinese economic expansion 
(Ba, 2016.). Moreover, pushing forward the 
idea of similar cooperation with Europe 
(Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership); Washington has been slowly 
fenced in China with two U.S.-led trade 
alliances based on internal protectionist 
barriers against Chinese goods. Indian 
Professor B. R. Deepak emphasised that 
developed countries see China as “the violator 
of the WTO rules”, because of its currency 
manipulation, violation of the copyright laws, 
manipulation of the export prices,” etc. 
(Deepak, 2015). For the avoidance of Chinese 
dominance, TPP offered a trade space for 
countries that respect global economic rules 
and adhere to U.S. standards of labour and 
environment – requirements that China cannot 
meet today. 
Despite the evidence, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership never officially defined itself as an 
“anti-China” partnership. The former U.S. 
President Obama stated that TPP is open to 
China, while the Chinese government 
welcomed the U.S. to join the OBOR project. 
Both governments were so diplomatic since the 
TPP and OBOR cover different areas – South 
Asia and Central Asia respectively. If the 
“Wilsonian” U.S. foreign policy had been 
continued, Chinese and American interests 
would have overlapped in the nearest future. 
However, at the end of 2016, then U.S. 
president-elect Donald Trump stated that the 
U.S. would withdraw from the TPP on his first 
day in office. And he fulfilled the promise. He 
believes that the TPP agreement provides too 
many opportunities for Asian corporations as to 
deprive jobs of American workers and cut 
benefits to U.S. companies (Subramaniam, 
2016). Instead of the multinational project, 
Trump is pursuing bilateral trade agreements 
with every country interested in investing in 
the U.S. economy. This means that TPP has lost 
its crucial contributor. Japan's Prime Minister, 
Shinzo Abe, once affirmed that without U.S. 
participation, TPP would be "meaningless" 
(Woolf, 2016).  
Content-analysis of Media: Estimation of Silk 
Road Projects in Interested States 
It is worth noting that the U.S. and China are 
not the only countries engaged in the 
development of Central Asia, but the 
implementation of mega-infrastructural 
projects will directly influence the economies 
and geopolitical strategies of the two principal 
actors in the region – Kazakhstan and Russia 
that supports both “Silk Roads”, but with some 
reservations. 
The primary source broadcasting Kazakhstan's 
attitude towards the projects is an official 
governmental newspaper “Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda”, which has published approximately 50 
articles on the OBOR in the last two years. 
Contrarily, just four of the published articles 
deal with the “New Silk Road”. Discussing 
OBOR, journalists and officials regularly stress 
the importance of the project to Kazakhstan’s 
economy and bilateral cooperation with China 
on over 51 projects that will cost China more 
than $26 billion. The Kazakh media has 
illuminated not only official meetings held by 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev and members 
of the government, but also academic 
conferences, roundtables on touristic potential, 
auto-championship “Silk Road” and even 
published articles written by pupils.  
“Kazakhstanskaya Pravda” does not contain any 
criticism of OBOR as is evidenced by positive 
highlights — that is, “Rapprochement with 
China”, “Potential of Great Way”, “Outstanding 
Model of Strategic Partnership”, “and Silk Road 
of Friendship”, etc. The newspaper argues that 
bilateral cooperation over the international 
OBOR project and Kazakhstan’s internal 
infrastructural initiative “Nurly Zhol” will make 
Kazakhstan a major player in Central Asia and 
add political scores to the global arena, while 
the American “New Silk Road” is mentioned 
just as a tool to de-escalate tensions in 
Afghanistan using CASA-1000 and the TAPI-
pipeline (Manaspaev, 2014). Here is a typical 
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paragraph from articles on Kazakhstan-Chinese 
relations:  
China and Kazakhstan have long-
standing partnerships and friendships. 
China welcomes the steady 
development of relations with 
Kazakhstan, as well as increased 
political trust and cooperation between 
the two countries. Regular meetings 
between President of Kazakhstan 
Nursultan Nazarbayev and President of 
China Xi Jinping contribute to further 
strengthening of bilateral relations 
(Seydildaeva 2016, 10).  
The only reservation Kazakhstan regularly 
stresses is that Astana welcomes Chinese policy 
aimed at establishing friendship instead of 
hegemony (Boranbaeva, 2016).  
Russia also supports the OBOR and 
development of Central Asia, but unlike 
Kazakhstan insists on the cooperation between 
China and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) 
that is mentioned many times in its official 
governmental newspaper “Rossyiskaya 
Gazeta”. Given that the main OBOR routes go 
around Russia, as a leader of the EEU, 
participating in the project is the only way for 
Kremlin to keep a political ability to outweigh 
Chinese economic advantages and influence 
over political ties of any EEU member with 
China. Also, in several articles President 
Vladimir Putin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Sergey Lavrov, then Chairman of Russian 
Parliament, Sergey Naryshkin and Chairman of 
the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko 
mentioned a “Great Eurasia” – a union of EEU 
and OBOR – which indicates Moscow as a place 
of cooperation over mutual geopolitical 
interests before its individual interests (Petrov, 
2015). 
However, Russian officials stress at least two 
risks in its close cooperation with China – that 
is, to become its “little brother” given Chinese 
economic and political power, and to be 
harmed in case of an eventual collapse of the 
Chinese economy (Maslov, 2016). Both of these 
risks may occur, experts say, but Russia should 
give the cooperation a shot and use Chinese 
economic potential for development of Russian 
and Central Asian infrastructure. As a result, 
now the EEU and China have a list of 40 
projects with a total cost of more than $30 
billion (Zubkov, 2016). Some of them have a 
crucial meaning for Chinese trade, such as 
future trade corridors in Primorye with a 
carrying capacity of one-sixth of the total 
Chinese trade (Galushka, 2016).  
In Chinese media, there are hundreds of 
articles and thousands of news devoted to 
OBOR. Journalists analyse political, economic, 
cultural, and social dimensions to the project 
and the benefits from regional development for 
China. The government of the People's 
Republic of China expresses its point of view 
mostly through its official "Xinhua News 
Agency". For the last two years, the agency 
published no less than one-hundred news 
articles on the OBOR initiative, the great 
majority of which describe dividends that 
countries will give to China after joining the 
project ("One Belt One Road to bring," 2016). 
Kyrgyzstan will provide assistance to the 
opening of an oil refinery factory and the 
"Datka-Kemin" 500kV power transmission line 
("Interview: Kyrgyzstan welcomes," 2016); 
Russia and Kazakhstan, vast investments into 
infrastructural projects (Lim et al, 2016); 
Uzbekistan, cooperation on industrial parks 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2016); Belarus, a 
gateway to Europe (“Belarus may turn,” 2016); 
etc. Within the articles, the agency carefully 
mentions some troubles and obstacles, but 
never criticises the project.  
It is also worth taking notice that news agency 
often uses the American name “New Silk Road” 
to determine OBOR’s part going through 
Central Asia. Moreover, there are no mentions 
of the U.S. project except for in a couple of 
articles on the TAPI investment agreement, 
which indicate that the Chinese government 
does not consider the “New Silk Road” a viable 
alternative to Central Asian development 
(“TAPI-pipeline to help,” 2016). 
In the U.S., official news about the “New Silk 
Road” is published on the website of U.S. State 
Department, but the majority was published 
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almost two years ago while the latest texts are 
dated April 2016. In the whole volume of 
information, the  U.S. officials stress two key 
ideas in their projects and plans for Central Asia 
in future. At first, that the “New Silk Road” was 
supposed to serve as an economic driver for 
Central Asian and Afghan development with 
diminished U.S. combat presence and Afghan 
National Security Forces (“Daniel Rosenblum's 
Remarks,” 2016). Second, that the “New Silk 
Road” and OBOR are not rivals, and that the U. 
S welcomes China’s development in the region. 
“The more investment you can bring in 
infrastructure in the region, in Asia more 
broadly, we think the better", in the words of 
former Deputy Secretary of State Antony J. 
Blinken ("Antony J. Blinken's remark," 2015). As 
for successes, the United States commemorate 
CASA-1000 and under-construction TAPI-
pipeline and share a vision of a stable and 
prosperous Central Asia ("Central Asia: What's 
next?” 2015). However, after April 2016, there 
was no official information about the "New Silk 
Road" or U.S. investment plans for the region.   
To sum up, it is safe to say that significant 
players express almost the same point of view 
on Central Asian development. First, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, and the U.S. support the 
Chinese OBOR because it brings investments 
into depressive and unstable regions. Second, 
all of the governments express worries about 
prospective Chinese political and economic 
strengthening in the region. Third, none of the 
governments considers the U.S. "New Silk 
Road" a viable project.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it should be noted that 
cooperation between the two states, the U.S. 
and China, in one united megaproject of the 
"Silk Road" would bring significant dividends to 
the region and each of the participants. 
However, mutual suspicions and lack of trust 
prevent the countries from uniting to achieve 
common goals. For many years, the U.S. has 
attempted to implement many initiatives in the 
region, while China has launched its project 
only recently.  
Beijing is concerned about the economic 
development of Central Asia concerning road 
construction, infrastructural centres and large 
projects. Beijing plans that goods be sold not 
only in Europe, but also in Asia, and also 
believes that it is necessary to help the 
developing republics to maintain stable 
consumer demand. The U.S. plays a supporting 
role in this, and the Chinese authorities have 
agreed to join forces in many projects; 
however, the Chinese government does not 
intend to share leadership and dividends with 
Washington.  
The American authorities, for their part, fear 
that China's excessive activity would turn the 
country into a Central Asian hegemon. 
Nonetheless, they admitted that the OBOR 
benefits the region, especially Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Stability in the region plays into the 
hands of the primary goal of the West – the 
energy security of Europe and diversity of 
supply routes.   
Today, it seems that the U.S. has not yet 
developed a single response to China’s 
economic expansion in the region – whether to 
support or to put spikes in the wheel. 
Moreover, the Republican arrival to power in 
the U.S. Congress and Trump’s victory in U.S. 
presidential elections have reversed eight years 
of Wilsonian policy, which implemented free 
trade across the globe, and replaced it with an 
isolationist approach that was demonstrated in 
its withdrawal from the TPP and its decreased 
presence in Central Asia. Experts tend to agree 
that this shift means the sunset of the "New 
Silk Road" initiative of the U.S.   
The failure of the “New Silk Road” and Trump’s 
rejection of the TPP has turned into a Christmas 
gift for China in the region. The current 
situation offers opportunities for Chinese 
infrastructure and investment projects, and 
they already re-energised discussions on the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 
or RCEP, and Free Trade Area of the Asia 
Pacific, or FTAAP. Nonetheless, China should 
weigh up, firstly, its own economic capacity to 
implement all these projects in Central Asia, 
the Middle East and South Asia, and, secondly, 
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the willingness of Asian countries to follow 
Chinese trade rules. The outcomes can be 
surprising.  
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